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Abstract
It would appear that some critics’ cure for the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is to build
it up, while for others, the cure is to tear it down, or at least to diminish its competence. This
seeming contradiction makes it difficult to assess and respond to legitimate criticisms of the WTO.
The purpose of this Essay is to address this apparent conundrum. In particular, we attempt to shed
light on it by (1) describing the nature of the imbalance that exists in the world trading system today
(Part I); (2) offering an historical and legal framework for understanding the seemingly conflicting
pressures that imbalance has created (Parts II and III); and (3) identifying and evaluating options
for moving forward, taking those pressures into account (Part IV).

HOMAGE TO A BULL MOOSE: APPLYING
LESSONS OF HISTORY TO MEET THE
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION
Theodore R. Posner* & Timothy M. Reif**
INTRODUCTION
The World War II career of General George Smith Patton,
Jr. is chronicled in the 1970 Academy Award-winning movie
named after its subject.1 One scene captures Patton's extraordinary knowledge of military history and his exceptional skills as a
tactician. It is dawn near Vendum in western France in August
1944. Patton, surveying the dead and wounded soldiers and the
smoldering hulks of tanks following a night battle with a German
armored division, concludes that the German army is finished:
You know how I'm sure they're finished out there? The carts.
They've been using carts to move their wounded and their
supplies. The carts came to me in my dream, kept buzzing
around in my head. Then, I remembered. That nightmare
in the snow. The endless, agonizing, retreat from Moscow.
How cold it was. We took the wounded and what was left of
the supplies and threw them in carts. Napoleon was finished.
any color left. Not even the red of blood. Only
There wasn't
2
the snow.
Patton's reference was to Napoleon's retreat from Moscow
that started in October 1812, pursued by the Russian army under
the command of General Mikhail Kutuzov, Supreme Commander of the Russian Forces under Czar Alexander IV The relevance of the historical reference was Patton's tactical conclusion
that the allies had been presented with a moment of opportunity
* Trade and Tax Counsel, Office of U.S. Representative Sander M. Levin.
** Democratic Chief Trade Counsel, U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means,
and Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The views of the
authors are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Committee on
Ways and Means or any of its Members. The authors thank Viji Rangaswami for her
thoughtful comments on and contributions to this Essay. Of course, the authors accept
sole responsibility for the views expressed herein.
1. PATTON (20th Century Fox 1990). The movie won eight Academy Awards in
1970, including Best Movie and Best Actor for George C. Scott in the title role.
2. Id.
3. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev
Kutuzov, at http://search.eb.com/bol/topic?eu'47611&query'kutuzov.
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and that his Third Army should4 continue to attack directly across
France and on into Germany.
The example of General Patton-and, in fact, the entire allied command led by General Eisenhower'-illustrates the importance of recalling relevant episodes in history and applying
lessons derived from those episodes. World War II presented
the defining moral, political, and military challenge of the twentieth century. The example of Generals Eisenhower, Marshall,
Bradley, Patton, and others is vital for us today as the United
States and virtually every other country in the world grapple with

the vast potential and imposing challenges of economic globalization.
Since the World Trade Organization 6 ("WTO") ministerial
in Seattle in December 1999, there has been much discussion of
the meaning of the events there-in particular, what the critics
of the WTO are most concerned about and how their concerns
can be addressed. A number of commentators have pointed out
that, in key respects, WTO critics are united in their unhappiness, but divided in the reasons behind it.' For example, those
4. This judgment was confirmed by, among others, General Omar N. Bradley. See
A SOLDIER'S STORY 432 (1951). Paul Reif, Timothy Reif's father,
served in the Army Intelligence Corps under Bradley in North Africa and the invasion
of Sicily.
5. See 1 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER 32, 70 (1983).
6. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
7. See Steve Pearlstein, Trade Theory Collides With Angry Reality, WASH. POST, Dec. 3,
1999, at Al (noting "serious disagreements within the ranks of the anti-globalization
movement"); see also Helene Cooper, Some Hazy, Some Erudite and All Angry, WI'O Protestors are Hard to Dismiss, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1999, at A2 (referring to "sheer diversity of
the groups that have come [to Seattle] to vent their ire at free trade and corporate
globalization"); James Cox, What Protestors Want From the WFO, USA TODAY, Dec. 2,
1999, at 02A (describing disparate goals of WTO protestors); James Cox & Del Jones,
This Weird Jamboree, USA TODAY Dec. 2, 1999, at 1 (stating that "[a] nti-WTO forces are
united by a profound mistrust of globalization-and almost nothing else"); Margot
Hornblower, The Battle in Seattle, TIME, Nov. 29, 1999, at 40, 42 (observing that "[t]he
antiglobalist message resonates across a broad swath of ideology, from the isolationist
Buchananite right to a kaleidoscope of left-wing groups"); Kim Murphy, In the Streets of
Seattle, Echos of Turbulent '60s Protest, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al (noting that
"[r]arely if ever have such unlikely groups joined forces in protest"); Steven Pearlstein,
Protest's Architect Gratified, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1999, at A01 (observing that "[t]he
throng of protesters in Seattle was uniquely diverse . . . united by a common concern
about the impact of globalization"); Skirmishes in Seattle, TIMES London, Dec. 2, 1999, at
27 (editorial describing protestors as having "a rag-bag of diverse causes"); Mark
Suzman & Frances Williams, Clinton Sympathetic to Protestorswho Force Delay in WFO MeetOMAR N.BRADLEY,
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concerned about strengthening adherence to internationally
recognized labor standards urge that the WTO be given competence over those issues.8 By contrast, many of those concerned
about the impact of trade rules on environmental protection
and conservation would like the WTO to stay out of those areas
or accord significantly greater deference to national regulatory
authorities.9
It would appear that some critics' cure for the WTO is to
build it up, while for others, the cure is to tear it down, or at least
to diminish its competence. This seeming contradiction makes
it difficult to assess and respond to legitimate criticisms of the
WTO.
The purpose of this Essay is to address this apparent conundrum. In particular, we attempt to shed light on it by
(1) describing the nature of the imbalance that exists in the
world trading system today (Part I); (2) offering an historical
and legal framework for understanding the seemingly conflicting pressures that imbalance has created (Parts II and III); and
ing, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at 1 (writing that "[a]lthough the hundreds of different
groups have diverse interests and agendas ranging from consumer rights to the environment, nearly all share the goal of trying to stop the planned launch of a new round of
trade liberalisation during the [Seattle Ministerial] meeting").
8. See Nancy Cleeland, Labor Leaders Want Worker Safeguards Built Into Trade Accords,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at Al1l; see also Cox, What Protestors Want, supra note 7, at 02A
(noting that "[unions] want 'core' labor standards written into WTO rules"); Steven
Greenhouse & Joseph Kahn, U.S. Efforts to Add Labor Standards to Agenda Fails, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at Al (quoting AFL-CIO President John Sweeney stating that an
eventual working group on trade and labor issues must be "'part of the W.T.O."'); Del
Jones, Unions Callfor FairTrade Practices, USA TODAY, Dec. 1, 1999, at 3B (providing that
"[w]hat union leaders want is to set international labor standards. If a country does not
permit unions or encourages child labor, the WTO should be able to find it guilty of
unfair trade just as it now does when exporters flood another country with cheap products"); Guy de Jonquires & Mark Suzman, Clinton Pushfor WFO LaborRules Draws Opposition, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at 1 (stating that "U.S. labour unions, which accounted
for most of the demonstrators, want the WTO to take a central role in enforcing core
labour standards worldwide"); Sebastian Mallaby, Big Nongovernment, WASH. POST, Nov.
30, 1999, at A29 (noting some protestors' interest in "new rules they want inserted in
the WTO charter"); Suzman & Williams, supra, note 7, at 1 (quoting Teamsters President James Hoffa stating: "[w]e're basically putting a human face on the WTO.... It
has to consider human rights and worker rights along with trade.").
9. See, e.g., Hornblower,supra note 7, at 41 (quoting Lori Wallach, Director of Public
Citizen's Global Trade Watch, stating, "'The WTO is an octopus with an arm into every
It trumps domestic laws and international treaties and
little crevice of democracy ....
imposes one-size-fits-all rules."'); The WfO Protest Pits: Luke Skywalkers against Darth
Vader, SEArLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 30, 1999, at A22 (describing protestors' ambition as "to destroy the WTO and the liberal trading system it represents").
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(3) identifying and evaluating options for moving forward, taking those pressures into account (Part IV).
We start our analysis with two basic premises. First, the
WTO, since it was established in 1995, has provided a robust
mechanism for adjudicating disputes between WTO Members."
Second, the success of WTO dispute settlement has focused attention on a fundamental imbalance in the rules-based trading
system between the ability of governments to keep the channels
of commerce free from barriers ("the policing function") and
their ability to shape the process of globalization so that it affirmatively promotes values such as worker rights and a clean environment ("the shaping function").
By "shaping" commerce, we mean regulating commerce in
ways designed to achieve ends that may or may not, strictly
speaking, be commercial. Those ends could include a clean environment, protection of worker rights, and promotion of
human rights, among others. Shaping has two dimensions. The
first is deference to "legitimate" national laws (i.e., laws that are
not merely pretexts for protection of national markets), notwithstanding their potential to diminish to some extent the free flow
of commerce. The second is the articulation and enforcement
of common standards among sovereign states, recognizing that
the pursuit of such standards may-at least in the short termimpose a slight burden on the flow of trade.
A hypothetical illustration of the first dimension is a dispute
settlement panel upholding a country's nondiscriminatory prohibition on the importation of shrimp caught in ways that endanger sea turtles.11 A hypothetical illustration of the second dimension is a multinational rule prohibiting trade in endangered
12
species.
The thesis of this Essay is that the main challenge for the
world trading system is to achieve better balance between the
10. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].

11. Cf United States-Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB1998-4, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (holding that U.S. embargo on shrimp caught
in manner harmful to sea turtles was WTO-consistent in principle but had been implemented in a WTO-inconsistent manner).
12. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora ("CITES"), Mar. 3, 1973, art. VIII, 27 U.S.T. 1087.
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policing function and the shaping function. The strength of the
policing function, as embodied primarily in the dispute settlement mechanism, makes the weakness of the shaping function
more clear. The disparity between them, we contend, is a key
factor in the increasingly vocal criticism of the WTO. In the
long run, a continued state of imbalance between these two
functions is likely to be unsustainable.
In Part II, we offer an historical analogy to the Progressive
Era in the United States in the early twentieth century to help
shed light on the nature of the current imbalance in the world
trading system.1 3 Then as now, economic integration was rapidly
outpacing the development of rules to govern it. Then as now,
juridical bodies-federal courts in the United States, dispute settlement panels in the WTO-were facilitating the economic
trend by upholding challenges to state laws that impeded interstate commerce. Then as now, there was mounting popular concern about an apparent bias in the regulation of commerce toward the interests of big corporations. Then as now, there was a
split among the system's critics between those who would expand the regulatory powers of central governing authorities and
those who would seek a solution in local governments. And,
then as now, there was an intense debate over what subjects
properly come within the purview of "regulation of commerce."
The example of the Progressive Era and the Progressive
Movement offer useful parallels with current challenges in the
context of economic globalization, which brings us to the title of
our Essay. The historical figure most closely associated with the
Progressive Movement in the United States is President Theodore Roosevelt. As President from 1901 to 1908, and as the
nominee of the Bull Moose Party in the Presidential election of
1912, Roosevelt articulated and began to implement an agenda
to respond to the changed realities that industrialization and related economic and technological forces were creating in the
United States at that time. Roosevelt consistently advocated an
activist and forward-looking agenda that embraced the changes
13. The Progressive Era is commonly thought to date from approximately 1900 to
approximately 1914. See RicHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 3 (1955). Hofstadter cites what he identifies as three "almost continuous" stages of the reform movements in the United States from the late 19th century to the mid 20th Century as being
(agrarian) populism in the 1890s; the Progressive Movement, 1900-1914; and the New
Deal, whose most dynamic phase was concentrated in the mid-1930s. See id.
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of his time and sought to create government mechanisms, where
necessary, to harness those changes so that the public would derive the maximum benefit. Roosevelt once stated:
We propose to lift the burdens from the lowly and the weary,
from the poor and the oppressed. We propose to stand for
the sacred rights of childhood and womanhood. Nay, more,
we propose to see that manhood is not crushed out of the
men who toil, by excessive hours of labor, by underpayment,
by injustice and oppression. When this purpose can only be secured by the collective action of our people through theirgovernmental
agencies, we propose to secure it.14
We need good laws just as a carpenterneeds good instruments. If he

has no tools, the best carpenter alive cannot do good work.
But the best tools will not make a good carpenter, any more
than to give a coward a rifle will make him a good soldier.
We wish to see the mass of our people move steadily upward
to a higher social, industrial, and political level.1 5
As President Roosevelt's comments foreshadow, the Progressive Movement unleashed a series of proposals in areas from
working conditions to antitrust law to shape the process of industrialization and maximize its benefits. In the United States, the
imbalance between policing and shaping was resolved by Congress's taking a more active role in legislating pursuant to its authority to regulate commerce among the states. This was made
possible, as a constitutional matter, by a shift in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the scope of Congress's power to regulate commerce. 6
As we discuss below, we do not doubt that many distinctions
can be drawn between the U.S. experience and the experience
of the world trading system today. Nonetheless, we believe the
U.S. example is most instructive about the tension within a commercial system where economic processes have evolved more
quickly than the regulatory mechanisms to govern them. That is
to say, it is most instructive about the current predicament of the
14. Theodore Roosevelt, The Purpose of the Progressive Movement, Speech at
Madison Square Garden, New York (Oct. 30, 1912), in THE THEODORE ROOSEVELT TREAsuRY: A SELF-PORTRAIT FROM HIS WRITINGs 316 (Easton Press 1988).
15. Theodore Roosevelt, Social Justice and PopularRule 106 (1926), quoted in THE
THEODORE ROOSEVELT TREASURY, supra note 14, at 307.
16. The critical shift was announced in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
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WTO and the world trading system, and less so about a precise
prescriptionfor addressing the problem.
In the problem-solving spirit of President Roosevelt, we
devote Part IV of this Essay to examining tools that may be available to the world trading system to improve the balance between
its policing and shaping functions.
I. THE IMBALANCE
In this section, we explain our two basic premises: namely,
that (1) the WTO dispute settlement system has proved to be
remarkably effective in its first six years, and (2) the strength of
this mechanism has pointed up the imbalance between policing
and shaping.
A. Rules To Promote Trade, Strong Dispute Settlement
From the WTO's establishment on January 1, 1995, through
December 13, 2000, 214 complaints had been filed under the
dispute settlement provisions of the WT0 1 v (a comparable number in six years to the complaints filed in more than forty years
under the WTO's predecessor regime, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade18 ("GATT")). By any standard, a system
able to process such a large number of complaints and able to
facilitate a resolution of more than half of those without resort
to formal adjudication can be considered efficient. That is particularly true when contrasted with its predecessor mechanism
under GATT, under which one party could block dispute settlement on a particular matter-or delay it indefinitely-at one or
more points, including formation of the panel, agreement on
terms of reference, adoption of the panel report, and suspension
of concessions.
The efficiency of the system in processing complaints is
matched by the wide range of matters that have been presented
to it. In particular, an increasing number of cases have concerned domestic regulatory policies that, not long ago, might
17. See World Trade Organization, Overview of the State of Play of WTO Disputes,
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/disp-e/dispu-e.htrn.
18. See Robert E. Hudec, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 417-585 (1991) (counting 207 complaints from
the founding of the GATT to 1989); see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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not have been considered part of the "trade" landscape.' 9 Complaints have addressed U.S. rules intended to protect sea tur21
tles, 20 an Australian quarantine on certain salmon imports,
E.U. regulations concerning importation of hormone-treated
beef,2 2 Japanese restrictions on the distribution, pricing, and
marketing of film, 23 and Massachusetts rules barring state agency
procurement from vendors that dealt in or with the country of
Burma (a protest against Burma's atrocious human rights record) .24
It is not particularly surprising that these matters have become an increasing point of focus for WTO dispute settlement.
GATT and WTO rules have sharply reduced tariff and traditional
non-tariff barriers; the remaining legal issues in these areas tend
to be relatively clear and, therefore, relatively easy to resolve.
The more difficult-and increasingly important-WTO cases involve the kinds of regulations involved in the cases noted above:
typically, regulations that on their face do not discriminate
against imports, but that, nonetheless, may place a disproportionate burden on imports (as compared to domestic products
or services) or may impede commerce to some extent.
It is vital for several reasons that WTO panels develop an
ability to distinguish correctly between facially-neutral measures
applied to protect local competitors and measures applied for
valid regulatory purposes. In this regard, the WTO's treatment
of facially neutral measures presents two basic issues in terms of
the policing-shaping balance. First, where GATT/WTO rules
19. A recent study by the World Bank points out that "[b]y the end of January
1999, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body had considered 25 disputes that referenced
either the [Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures] or
the [Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade]." WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2001, at 86 (2000) (citingJohn S. Wilson,
THE POsT-SEATTLE AGENDA OF THE WTO IN STANDARDS AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO
TRADE: ISSUES FOR THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1999)).
20. United States-Import Prohibitionon CertainShrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of
the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
21. Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, Appellate Body Report
and Panel Report, WT/DS18/11 (Apr. 8, 1998).
22. European Communities-Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, WT/DS26/13, WT/DS48/1 1 (Feb. 19, 1998).
23. Japan-MeasuresAffecting Consumer PhotographicFilm and Paper, Panel Report,
WT/DS44/5 (Apr. 23, 1998).
24. United States-MeasureAffecting Government Procurement, Request for Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, WT/DS88/3 (Sept. 9, 1998).
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provide for taking into account ends that may or may not, strictly
speaking be "commercial" (e.g., GATT Article XX), do these
rules do so in an adequate way? Second, do existing rules reflect
an appropriate balance between policing and shaping? Or, does
the current structure of the system reinforce a view that any domestic law or regulation is a potential trade25 barrier and, therefore, a target for elimination by the WTO?
B. Tensions Within the System-Pressuresfor Change
Many critics of the WTO (especially in the United States)
consider that its members have found a workable mechanism to
enforce adherence to rules, but have harnessed that mechanism
to an incomplete and therefore biased set of rules. These
groups have responded in different ways. Some have urged reform of WTO rules, mostly by expanding them to cover emerging
issues, such as the nexus between trade and labor market standards. For example, in a major address shortly before the 1999
WTO Seattle Ministerial, AFL-CIO President John Sweeney
called upon the WTO to "incorporate rules to enforce workers'
rights and environmental and consumer protections and compliance should be required of any new member."2 6 This position
regards dismantling the WTO as a last resort, only if all else fails.
By contrast, others, including certain environmental and
human rights groups, see dismantling the WTO or strictly limiting its powers as an option of first resort. 27 These groups seem
25. Cf Moving Forward: Rebuilding a Working Consensus on Trade, 31 LAw & POL'Y OF
Bus. 911, 913 (2000) (summary of remarks by Daniel Tarrullo) (stating that "Tarrullo suggested that negotiations are often undertaken primarily with export interests
in mind. He said that this approach in a sense turns everything into a trade barrier.").
26. John Sweeney, Making the Global Economy Work for Working Families: Beyond the WTO, Remarks at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 19, 1999).
In his Pre-Seattle remarks, Mr. Sweeney referred to the WTO as "a constitution with a
Bill of Rights that guarantees only the rights of property." Id. at 3. The implication is
that this "Bill of Rights" ought to be expanded, not abandoned.
27. See generally Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?:
CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY (1999); Jerry Mander &
John Cavanagh, W1O Feeds Corporate Greed, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 1999, at Al4 (proposing
"an immediate moratorium on any expanded rules of trade"); Natalia A. Feduschak,
WTO Violence Rages as Talks are Resurrected,WASH. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at Al (stating that
Pat Buchanan described WTO as "'embryonic monster"'); Timothy Burn, WTO Foes
Vow to BringFightto Congress, Upcoming Elections, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at A14 (quoting Lori Wallach, Director of Global Trade Watch, stating that "[w]e intend to ensure
that, first, the WTO is not expanded and, second, that its current agenda is turned
around.").
INT'L
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less concerned about balancing the rules enforced by the WTO
and more concerned about confining the authority of the WTO,
whatever the rules it enforces. Thus, in his preface to a monograph sharply criticizing the first five years of the WTO, Ralph
Nader states, "One of the clearest lessons that emerges from a
study of industrialized societies is that the centralization of commerce is environmentally and democratically unsound. No one
denies the usefulness of some international trade. But societies
need to focus their attention on fostering community-oriented
28
production.
From this point of view, no amount of reform of the WTO is
demonize the
enough. This second brand of criticism tends to
''29
WTO, harkening back to images of "GATTzilla.
As we see it, while the reformers and the dismantlers may
diverge in their prescription, their perception of the problem is
essentially the same: that trade rules focus on policing largely to
the exclusion of shaping. As one observer recently commented,
"The steamroller of economic globalism is not matched by the
development of a global politics that can respond to it."3 Economic growth and integration have outpaced the development
of political institutions that govern economic processes."1 The
existing rules of commerce were designed primarily to address
transactions within nation states. They have not caught up with
the fact that national borders are increasingly irrelevant to producers and consumers. To the extent that the rules do take the
globalization phenomenon into account, they do so in a way that
essentially encourages the existing trend.
The sense that there is a serious disconnect between the
scope of economic processes and the reach of rules to govern
those processes is not limited to a handful of critics at the
fringes. A recent survey of U.S. public opinion suggests that the
American public perceives the same imbalance: "[a] strong ma28. See Ralph Nader, Preface to Wallach & Sforza, supra note 27, at xi.
29. See id. at 13.
30. Steven Pearlstein, Leaders Coming to a Consensus on the Need for Rules to End the
Excesses of Free Trade, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2000, at HI (quoting Mark Malloch-Brown,
head of United Nations Development Program).
31. See Fareed Zakaria, Globalization Grows Up and Gets Political,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
2000, §4 at 9 (arguing that politics of globalization will have to catch up with economics
of globalization in the coming decade); Philip Stephens, Broken Borders of the Nation
State, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at 19 (arguing that "economics rather than politicians is
forcing the pace of integration").
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jority [of Americans] feels trade has not grown in a way that adequately incorporates concerns for American workers, international labor standards and the environment."3 2 And, the dilemma is taken seriously even by ardent defenders of the world
trading system.3 3
Right now, the global politics of trade has predominantly
one mode: the barrier-eliminating, or policing, mode. The message of the critics is that it cannot operate in this mode alone.
For a better understanding of the dimensions of the dilemma, we turn in Part II to an analogy to the United States at
the beginning of the twentieth century. The solution to the
global imbalance between policing and shaping functions will
undoubtedly be different from the U.S. solution to the national
imbalance almost a century ago. Nonetheless, the analogy highlights the need to correct the imbalance-and the fact that, with
creativity, perseverance, and courage, it can be done.
II. FIXING THE U.S. IMBALANCE: THE LEGACY OF THE
PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT AND THE NEW DEAL
A. Congress's Commerce Power: Three Phases
In the United States, the federal government's power over
interstate commerce is grounded in Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution, which provides: "The Congress shall have Power
to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
...
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."3 4 The purpose of this
grant of power to Congress, as explained by Alexander Hamilton, was to suppress "the interfering and un-neighborly regulations of some States"-regulations which, "if not restrained by a
national control" could create "serious sources of animosity and
discord." 5
32. Program on International Policy Attitudes, School of Public Policy, University
of Maryland: Americans on Globalization (2000), quoted in U.S. TRADE DEFICIT REVIEW
COMMISSION, THE U.S. TRADE DEFICIT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ACTION 7 (2000).
33. See Richard W. Stevenson, Global Trade Strengthens Economies, Greenspan Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at C2 (quoting Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Chairman,
who states, "Still, the arguments against the global trading system that emerged first in
Seattle and then spread over the past year arguably touched a chord in many people, in
part by raising the fear that they would lose local political control of their destinies.").
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 192 (Alexander Hamilton) (Harvard Univ. Press ed.,
1961).
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More than a century and a half later, the Supreme Court
echoed Hamilton's words, observing that achieving uniformity in
the regulation of commerce among the states was "[t]he sole
purpose for which Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately produced the Constitution."3 6 Indeed, "The necessity of
centralized regulation of commerce among the states was so obvious and so fully recognized that the few words of the Commerce Clause were little illuminated by debate."3 7
Much has been written about the development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Our purpose here is not to re-till
that soil. Rather, it is to review, in broad strokes, the evolution
of the Commerce Clause to illustrate the parallels in the current
evolution of the regime governing global commerce. For purposes of this discussion, we identify three discrete phases in the
evolution of the Commerce Clause.
B. Phase 1: 1 793-1870s, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
Assumes the Creation of a National Market
The first phase runs from the founding of the Republic to
approximately the mid-1870s. During this period, Congress exercised its Commerce Clause power sparingly and within a narrowly defined scope (by today's standards).38 The focus of regulation was on the byways and instrumentalities of commerce
(e.g., licensing of vessels on navigable waters, provision of interstate highways, regulation of interstate rail transport, regulation
of telegraph lines). For example, the first Commerce Clause
case to come before the Supreme Court dealt with vessel licensing." The matter concerned a conflict between New York's
grant of an exclusive license to a company running steamboats
between New York and New Jersey, and the federal government's grant under a federal statute of a competing license to
36. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (Jackson, J.).
37. Id. at 534.
38. See AnnaJohnson Cramer, The Right Results for all the Wrong Reasons: An Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REV. 271, 275 (2000)
("[T]he [Constitutional] Convention anticipated three types of legislation: (1) navigation acts, (2) tariffs, and (3) acts preventing states from imposing duties upon articles
imported from or through other states."). The scope was not understood, during this
initial phase, as encompassing conduct that affected commerce or the flow of commerce, but which conduct did not in and of itself constitute commerce. It was understood to comprehend the interchange of goods for sale across state lines.
39. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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another company.4" At issue was whether the term "commerce"
encompassed "navigation" or, as the holder of the New York license contended, was restricted to "traffic, to buying and selling,
or the interchange of commodities."'" The Court held that the
term did, indeed, encompass navigation. 2 It then went on to
provide an expansive interpretation of Congress's Commerce
Clause power, the implications of which would not be fully realized until years later.
Shortly after the Gibbons decision, the Court articulated the
so-called "dormant commerce clause" doctrine in the matter of
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 4 3 The doctrine addressed
the issue of congressional silence in the face of state measures
that impede the flow of interstate commerce. In theory, the
states might erect numerous illegitimate barriers to commerce.
It would be impracticable for Congress to address each separately. To deal with this problem, the Court found the power in
the federal judiciary to interpret congressional silence as authority to strike impermissible state impediments to commerce as unconstitutional. As the Court explained in subsequent cases, the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is either inherent in the
Commerce Clause itself (on the theory that the grant of power
to Congress necessarily preempted state laws impeding commerce) or implicit in Congress's silence. 44 In fact, the Court in
Willson upheld the state regulation at issue.4 5 But here, as in
Gibbons, the seeds of future tension were sown.
40. Id. at 189, 193.
41. Id. at 189.
42. Id. at 193 ("The word used in the Constitution, then, comprehends, and has
been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its meaning, and a power to
regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word
'commerce."').
43. 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829).
44. See H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 533, 535 (1949) ("distinction between the
power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety and from
fraud, even when those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of
power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic
advantage, is one deeply rooted in both our history and the law. [This] Court consistently has rebuffed attempts of states to advance their own commercial interests by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of the state, while
generally supporting their right to impose even burdensome regulations in the interest
of local health and safety."). See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 213
(12th ed. 1991) (to justify dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, Court "has relied
largely on history and on inferences from the federal structure").
45. Willson, 27 U.S. at 252 (holding that Delaware's authorization to company to
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One of the first instances of application of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine to strike down a state law was the
Court's 1876 decision in Welton v. Missouri.4 6 That matter concerned a state law requiring a "peddler's license" to sell goods
from out-of-state but not to sell goods from in-state. The Court
held that this plainly discriminatory law (analogous, in WTO
terms, to a violation of the core principle of national treatment)
was unconstitutional, notwithstanding that there was no conflicting federal regulation. Applying the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, the Court found that Congress's "inaction on this subject ... is equivalent to a declaration that inter-state commerce

shall be free and untrammeled."4 7 Following Welton, the Court
entered into a period of robust activity under the dormant Commerce Clause, often striking down state laws as illegitimate impediments to interstate commerce.4 8
In sum, the first phase in the evolution of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence was characterized principally by the Court's development and application of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in a manner that promoted and facilitated the economic
integration of the United States.
C. Phase 2: 1870s-1937, the Court Limits Congress's Power to
Regulate Commerce
The second key phase of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
began in the mid-1870s, with the industrialization of the U.S.
economy and Congress's responses. As one scholar summarized
the profound changes occurring in American society in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
The conditions of American life changed rapidly following
the Civil War. Agriculture was made over; railroads were laid
build a dam across a creek was not "repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its
dormant state" or contrary to any federal law).
46. 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
47. Id. at 282.
48. See The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation,S.
Doc. No. 6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 160 (citing E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN EGAN,
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 14 (Callagan & Co., eds., 1898))
(noting that "[o]f the approximately 1400 cases which reached the Supreme Court
under the [commerce] clause prior to 1900, the overwhelming proportion stemmed
from state legislation"). "The result was that, generally, the guiding lines in construction of the clause were initially laid down in the context of curbing state power rather
than in that of its operation as a source of national power." Id.
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down; the population soared; villages became towns and
towns became huge cities; business and labor organizations
appeared. America was rapidly being transformed into an urban, industrialized, capitalist society. These changing conditions created a host of difficult problems and made it essential that older ideas be adjusted or abandoned and that new
institutions and doctrines be devised.4 9
In response to these changes, Congress passed a number of
laws regulating the operation of interstate rail carriers, clearly
instruments of interstate commerce. However, Congress's responses went beyond regulating the manner of their movement
from state to state to new aspects of commercial activity. For example, an act of 1873 regulated the rail transport of livestock,
"so as to preserve the health and safety of the animals."5 This
was followed by the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, the Hours of
Service Act of 1907, and the Federal Employers Liability Acts of
1906 and 1908, all governing various aspects of employment on
the interstate rail system.5 1
Moreover, this period saw Congress beginning to use its jurisdiction over interstate commerce to enact laws intended to
protect the safety and health (including moral health) of the nation. This category of laws included prohibitions on the interstate transport of diseased livestock, lottery tickets, and prostitutes. Essentially, Congress found in the Commerce Clause the
authority to exercise what had been referred to as the "police
power" when exercised by the states.5 2
The Supreme Court responded to Congress's exercises of
the Commerce Clause power with two divergent lines of decisions. On the one hand, the Court upheld regulation of the railroads and nationwide health- and safety-based restrictions.5 3
However, the Court drew the line when it came to broader economic regulation. Here, the Court's approach was to compart49. Andrew M. Scott, The ProgressiveEra in Perspective, 21 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 685,
(citing THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT: 1900-1912 (1958)).

698-99 (1959)

50. See The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation,
supra note 48, at 176 (citing 17 Stat. 353 (1873)).
51. Id. at 179.
52. Id. at 203.
53. See, e.g., Second Employers Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (upholding the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA")); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45
(1911) (upholding Pure Food and Drugs Act); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)
(upholding federal prohibition on interstate transport of lottery tickets).
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mentalize economic processes by applying a narrow definition of
the term "commerce." The Court found that all of the activity
that took place within a state before a product entered the
stream of interstate commerce or after it reached its final destination was beyond Congress's reach.
In brief, the Court focused very narrowly on the particular
activity that Congress was seeking to regulate, rather than on the
larger transaction of which that activity was a part.14 This led the
Court to hold beyond Congress's Commerce Clause power laws
affecting everything from wages and hours, to workplace conditions, to child labor. For example, in 1916, Congress enacted a
statute prohibiting interstate commerce in products of child labor.5 5 Two years later, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,5 6 the Supreme
Court struck down the law, holding: "[T]he mere fact that
[products made from child labor] were intended for interstate
subcommerce transportation does not make their production
'5 7
ject to federal control under the commerce power."
The views expressed in the Court's closely divided opinions
in Hammer and other cases foreshadow many of the debates occurring today over the proper scope of international rules governing globalization. The nexus between labor standards and
commerce is a good example. The arguments of those who
would keep labor standards off of the world trade agenda today
contain echoes of. the Court's reasoning in Hammer, when it
stated: "[m]any causes may co-operate to give one State, by reason of local laws or conditions, an economic advantage over
others. The Commerce Clause was not intended to give to Congress a general authority to equalize such conditions."5 8
The major exception to the Court's narrow approach was its
treatment of antitrust law. The Sherman Antitrust Act was en54. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) ("Mining brings the
subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it."); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935) (drawing distinction between
direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce and recognizing Congress's power to
regulate former but not latter); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (stating that "[o]ver interstate transportation, or its incidents, the regulatory power of Congress is ample, but the production of articles intended for interstate commerce is a
matter of local regulation"); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
55. Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 431, 39 Stat. 675.
56. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
57. ld. at 272.
58. Id. at 273.
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acted in 1890. 5" The Court first considered the Act in 1895,
holding that monopolization of sugar manufacturing did not
amount to monopolization of commerce.60 However, ten years
later, in the seminal case of Swift & Co. v. United States,61 the
Court moved beyond its compartmentalized view of economic
processes when it came to competition. Swift involved practices
that amounted to price fixing in the Chicago livestock and meat
markets. Instead of focusing narrowly on particular practices,
such as bidding at the stockyards, the Court looked at the big
picture and held that the practices at issue were all part of "commerce" and subject to Congress's power.62
In Swift, the Court conceived of commerce as a flow of activity, rather than a discrete event along the path from production
to consumption. However, that seemingly common-sense approach remained the exception for some time. The main trend
during this period was the Court's continuing compartmentalization of economic processes in a way that strictly constrained
Congress's efforts to enact economic regulations.
The net result of the Court's aggressive invocation of the
dormant Commerce Clause, coupled with its narrowly drawn
constraints on congressional authority, was to facilitate the expansion of economic activity on a national scale, while constraining the power of the federal government to regulate on
that same scale. Put another way, the dynamic on display at the
beginning of the twentieth century was a robust exercise of the
policing function in the service of national economic expansion,
coupled with a relatively weak exercise of the shaping functionroughly the same dynamic that is occurring in the world economy today.
This imbalance was very much the impetus for the Progressive Movement that coalesced in the first decades of the twentieth century. People were used to state and local government
being the primary locus of rule making and rule enforcement.
But as economic activity took on a national scope, state and local
governments were not adequately equipped to deal with new
59. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) (originally enacted 1890).
60. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895).
61. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
62. See id. at 398-99 ("[T]he current thus existing is a current of commerce among
the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.").
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regulatory challenges."
A sense of disconnect between the economic and political
spheres prompted a proliferation of ideas for reform. Some,
such as Louis Brandeis, urged that state and local governments
be the primary engines of change, while others, such as Theodore Roosevelt, argued that as commerce took on a national
scope, so the power of government to shape the rules should go
national.6 4 But, despite divergent prescriptions, both factions
put pressure on the system for change, such that the Progressive
Movement became a major national political force.
Many of the reforms spawned by the Progressive Movement
are familiar: federal regulation of food and drug safety, federal
antitrust laws, a nationwide program of conservation of natural
resources, a federal income tax, federal regulation of the securities markets, and national labor standards. In general, these reforms were in the nature of what we have called government's
shaping function. As we have seen, the Court's limitation on
Congress's power was the principal constitutional barrier to the
Progressive agenda. It prevented the shaping function of the
federal government from becoming as robust as the policing
function had become through the Court's invocation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
D. Phase 3: 1937 to 2001, the Court Liberates Congress's Power and
Balance is Restored
The third phase in Commerce Clause evolution began in
1937, when the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act
of 1935 in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel.65 Over the previous
two decades, pressure for the Progressive agenda had continued
to build. That pressure reached its peak during the Great Depression, when President Franklin Roosevelt attempted to put
63. See Michael J. Sandel, America's Search for a New Public Philosophy, ATLANTIC
Mar. 1996, at 57 (stating that "new forms of commerce and communication
spilled across familiar political boundaries and created networks of interdependence
among people in distant places. But the new interdependence did not carry with it a
new sense of community.").
Progressive Platform of 1912 in III HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL
64. See, e.g.,
ELECTIONS: 1789-1968 175, 176 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., 1971) (The 1912 Progressive Party platform advocated "bringing under effective national jurisdiction those
problems which have expanded beyond reach of the individual states."). See generally
Scott, supra note 49, at 689.
65. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
MONTHLY,
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large parts of that agenda into effect through the New Deal.
The Court's adherence to its narrow interpretation of Congress's
power ultimately met with the President's famous threat to pack
the Court with Justices sympathetic to the New Deal. Out of this
crisis arose a revolution in the Court's interpretation of the
Commerce Clause and a watershed in the history of Congress's
power under that provision.
The Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel abandoned the distinctions between "direct" and "indirect" effects on commerce and
between "production" or "manufacturing" and "commerce," to
which it had clung for so many years. Instead, the Court held
that the correct inquiry is whether intrastate activities have "such
a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
from burdens and obstructions."66 The Court held:
The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce
from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions
which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of
interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens or obstructions may
be due to injurious action springing from other sources. The
fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for
'its protection and advancement;' to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and insure its safety;' 'to foster, protect, control and restrain.' That power is plenary and may be exerted
to protect interstate commerce 'no matter what the source of
the dangers which threaten it.'67
Then, in one fell swoop, the Court abandoned the reasoning it had used for more than thirty years to restrict Congress's
Commerce Clause power, stating: "[T]he fact that the employees here concerned were engaged in production is not determinative. The question remains as to the effect upon interstate
commerce of the labor practice involved."6
Cases following Jones & Laughlin Steel reinforced a new, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In 1941, the
Court overruled Hammer and upheld the Fair Labor Standards
Act 69 as a constitutional exercise of Congress's power. 70 In 1942,
66.
67.
68.
69.

Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37 (1937).
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 40.
29 U.S.C. §201.
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the Court held Congress's power to reach even conduct whose
connection to interstate commerce was seemingly negligible (in
this case, production on a small family farm of wheat for consumption on the farm)."1
The Court's new, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause enabled Congress to enact laws in areas that,
under the Court's previous approach, would have been ruled
well beyond Congress's reach, including civil rights laws, labor
laws, environmental laws, and criminal laws. Challenges to these
new exercises of power, most notably in the civil rights area, gen2
erally were defeated.1
In sum, two key dimensions stand out in the U.S. experience. First, the Supreme Court-through the development and
enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine-facilitated the trend toward integration of the national economy. In
this context, the Court first assumed and then continued to exercise a strong "policing" function. Second, the scope of Congress's power to regulate commerce, as defined by the Court,
remained very narrow for over a century, until various events
precipitated a major interpretive shift. In this context, the federal government's "shaping" function was strictly constrained for
more than thirty years.
These same dimensions are vital parts of today's world trading system: (1) the trend toward globalization of economic
processes is greatly facilitated by a legal system that keeps the
channels of commerce free from WTO-inconsistent regulatory
impediments and (2) the consensus on what properly comes
within the scope of regulation of commerce is still very limited.
In short, the world trading system is grappling with questions of
whether its rules should reach issues such as the regulation of
labor markets and effective enforcement of competition laws
and environmental standards, just as the U.S. government grappled with similar issues a century ago.

70. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
71. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
72. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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III. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE:
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE
HISTORICAL ANALOGY

The next question is: What are the strengths or weaknesses
of using the U.S. experience as a tool to understand and deal
with the imbalance in world trading rules today?
In the United States, the legislative solution to the policingshaping imbalance was predicated on key features of the U.S.
legal and political system, as well as on economic, social, and
other characteristics of the United States as a country. In particular, the Constitution provided a textual basis for a legislative
solution by vesting power to regulate commerce in a federal legislature. Strong democratic institutions provided political legitimacy to that solution. If the people felt that Congress was going
too far in its regulation of commerce, they could always express
their opposition freely and ultimately elect more restrained legislators. v3 And, relative homogeneity made a federal legislative solution practicable; that is, common rules could be implemented
with relative ease across. the country.
By contrast, the structural features that characterize the
world trading system today are different in at least five significant
respects. First, the WTO today is a far more limited institution
than was the U.S. Government, even a century ago. The world
trading system has no Commerce Clause. Indeed, it has no legislature. It has "laws" in the form of the agreements of the WTO
and a "court" in the form of the panels and the Appellate Body
operating under the Dispute Settlement Understanding. However, those elements do not comprise a "government" in the
usual meaning of that term. The WTO's jurisdiction is limited
to the areas that have been negotiated since 1947. It makes law
only rarely, when consensus can be achieved among its 140
members. It has no power to force compliance with its decisions; it is in large measure the long-term interest of its members
in the integrity of the system that results in compliance.
Second, there is substantial diversity among the 140 members. This group of countries represents the full spectrum of
73. As the Supreme Court stated in its very first Commerce Clause case, "The wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which
their constituents possess at elections are ... the sole restraints" on its exercise of the
power to regulate commerce. Gibbons 22 U.S. at 197.
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economic development. Political, legal, and cultural institutions
also vary widely from country to country. The degree of diversity
suggests certain limits on the ability to use negotiation to bring
about a better balance between policing and shaping.
A third key feature of the "ATO system is its relative newness. The modern regime of rules-based trade, with quasi-judicial, binding dispute settlement at its core, is only six years old.
The youth of the WTO's institutions presents both opportunities
and challenges. The WTO-particularly, its dispute settlement
system-is not burdened with decades of entrenched practices
and, therefore, may in principle be able to respond to the evolving needs of the system. At the same time, these institutions are
in the process of building their legitimacy and, therefore, are
still relatively weak.
A fourth feature is the multiplicity of forums for developing
rules. In addition to the WTO, there are regional arrangements,
such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum; free trade
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement;7 4 customs unions, such as Mercosur; 75 bilateral agreements, such as the recently completed agreement between the
United States and Vietnam; and preferential trade arrangements, under the Generalized System of Preferences and similar
76
laws.
These multiple arrangements offer the possibility of addressing in smaller contexts newer issues or problems as to
which broad international consensus has not been reached. For
example, in the 1980s, the United States was able to press for the
development of international rules protecting intellectual property rights utilizing U.S. law, 77 bilateral agreements, 78 and even74. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S. arts.
1902-04, 32 I.L.M. 605, 682-84 (entered into forceJan. 1994).
75. See, Treaty of Asuncion, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (establishing common
market between Argentine Republic, Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of Paraguay, and Republic of Uruguay).
76. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2461 (2000)
77. 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000) (containing the "Special 301" provisions of U.S. law).
78. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2000 TRADE POLICY
AGENDA AND 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, Annex III (2000) (listing bilateral agreements, including
Agreement with Singapore on Intellectual Property Rights Protection (April 27, 1987);
Agreement on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Between

the United States and Sri Lanka (Sept. 20, 1991); Agreement on Intellectual Property
Protection with Taiwan (June 5, 1992); Agreement on Intellectual Property Protection
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tually the NAFTA, before finally concluding the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights7'
("TRIPs") in the WTO. Similarly, today, areas such as the intersection between trade and labor standards, competition policy,
investment issues, and the intersection between trade and environmental regulation may usefully be pursued in these narrower
contexts.
A fifth dimension is the relatively high degree of influence
that larger trading countries-the United States, the European
Union, Japan, Canada, and a handful of other countries-can
have on shaping global trade rules. The leverage these countries
have derives largely from the heavy reliance of other countries
on access to their markets. As the example of intellectual property rights makes clear, these larger trading countries can have
more of an opportunity to influence the agenda and, to a degree, the outcome of negotiations.
In sum, the world trading system faces an imbalance between policing and shaping very similar to the imbalance faced
by the United States a century ago. But the structure of the
world trading system is fundamentally different from the structure of the U.S. government in ways that make the solution
achieved in the United States of limited relevance as a model.
IV. TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING A BETTER BALANCE IN THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
Bearing in mind the key structural features discussed above,
we now explore three options that may be available to the world
trading system for bringing about a better balance between policing and shaping (1) amendment or elaboration of WTO rules,
(2) operation of WTO dispute settlement, and (3) utilization of
mechanisms outside the VTO. These are not necessarily the
only channels for change. However, they provide good illustrations of the possibilities in this area.

with Taiwan (Trademark) (April 1993); Agreement on Intellectual Property Protection
with Taiwan (Copyright) Uuly 16, 1993)).
79. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, wTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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A. MultilateralDecision Making
The WTO Agreement provides two formal mechanisms for
changing or clarifying WTO rules: (1) interpretations of the
WTO agreements and (2) amendment of the WTO agreements.
In both cases, the ordinary practice is for decisions to be made
by consensus.""
Interpretations may be made by either the Ministerial Conference or the General Council of the WTO, both of which are
comprised of representatives of all WTO members."' The Ministerial Conference, which convenes at least once every two years,
is the primary decision making body of the WTO. The General
Council carries out the functions of the Ministerial Conference
in the intervals between meetings of the Conference. 2 If there
is a failure of consensus within the Ministerial Conference or
General Council, then interpretations may be adopted by a
three-fourths majority of the members.8
The amendment process is more complicated. 4 A preliminary decision on whether to submit an amendment to WTO
members must be made in the first instance by the Ministerial
Conference. This decision ordinarily must be made by consensus, but may be made by a two-thirds majority if consensus is not
reached within ninety days of the formal proposal of an amendment. 5 The rules governing adoption of amendments vary depending on the nature of the amendment, with some requiring
consensus, 8 6 while others require only a twothirds majority.8 7
At least one thing is clear about WTO interpretations and
amendments: they are not designed to be taken regularly or
80. See WTO Agreement arts. IX(1) (interpretation), X(1) (amendment).
81. Id. art. IV(1).
82. Id. art. IV(2). For the General Council to act on a formal interpretation, that
interpretation must be recommended by the Council on Trade in Goods, the Council
on Trade in Services or the TRIPs Council (each of which follows the practice of consensus decision making).
83. Id.
84. While the hurdles to consideration of interpretations are slightly lower, the
scope of what can be accomplished through interpretations is also more limited. The
Agreement Establishing the WTO expressly provides that the interpretation process
"shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the amendment provisions in
Article X." WTO Agreement art. IX(2).
85. Id. art. X(1).
86. Id.art. X(2).
87. Amendments adopted by two-thirds majority apply to only those members that
accept them if those amendments alter WTO rights and obligations. Id. art. X(3),(4).
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readily. In fact, there has not been a single interpretation or
amendment adopted since the WTO came into effect in 1995,
and there were only six amendments (the last in 1965) in the
previous forty-eight years of GATT.8 8 Moreover, the interpretation or amendment process-particularly, achieving a consensus-is only likely to become more difficult as the number of
WTO members grows.
As a result, for the foreseeable future, changes to WTO
rules are likely to continue to be made almost exclusively in the
cointext of negotiations involving a defined variety of areas of
interest to all members. As the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds illustrated, such negotiations can take more than five years to
complete .89
B. Dispute Settlement
A second channel for adjusting the balance between the
shaping and policing functions is through decisions of WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body. In this area, the
opportunity is not in the creation of new rules to shape the
globalization process, but rather in the application of existing
rules that already provide at least a few general guideposts that
incorporate considerations that may or may not, strictly speaking, be commercial.
To understand this opportunity, recall that in Part I, we defined the "shaping" function as having two basic dimensions:
(1) deference to "legitimate" national laws (i.e., laws that are not
merely pretexts for protection of national markets), notwithstanding their potential to diminish the free flow of commerce
and (2) articulation and enforcement of common standards
among sovereign states, recognizing that the pursuit of such
standards may impose a slight burden on the flow of trade.
In this regard, there are several ways under current WTO
rules for panels and the Appellate Body to affect the first dimension of the shaping function. One obvious way is through application of the exceptions provided at Article XX of the GATT.
Article XX permits parties to derogate from other GATT provi88. 1 GATT Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law & Practice 928 (1994).
89. For a discussion of ways to simplify and accelerate negotiations, see Timothy M.
Reif & Viji Rangaswami, JoltinJoe Has Left and Gone Away-Embracing Change: The Way
Forwardfor U.S. Trade Policy and the WTO, 32 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. (2000).
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sions to enforce certain measures, including for the protection
of "human, animal or plant life or health,"9 ° in relation to "products of prison labour,"'" or 92in relation to "conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
However, as is apparent, the Article XX exceptions cover a
limited number of policy areas. As Professor Frieder Roessler
observes, "[T] here are far more legitimate policy goals that can
only be attained by distinguishing between different product categories. For instance, policies designed to harmonize technical
standards, to avoid the accumulation of waste, or to tax the consumption of luxury goods are not among the policies covered by
the exemptions in Article XX." 9'
In addition to Article XX, there is a second way for panels
and the Appellate Body to incorporate a consideration of valid
non-commercial policy objectives into their decisions. To illustrate this point, we use the example of panel determinations of
whether national laws, regulations, or other measures are inconsistent with the national treatment provisions of a WTO agreement. The core national treatment obligation, in agreements
such as the GATT, the General Agreement on Trade in Services9" ("GATS"), and TRIPs, requires that WTO members accord to imported products or services treatment "no less
favorable" than that accorded to "like" domestic products or services.
For more than a decade, the key issue for panels applying
the national treatment obligation has been national laws that do
not on their face discriminate against imported goods or services.9 5 It is in this context-i.e., cases involving facially neutral
90. GATT art. XX(b).
91. Id. art. XX(e).
92. Id. art. XX(g), which provides in full that measures must be "relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." A measure that
meets any one of the Article XX tests must also meet the general Article XX requirements that "(a) it not be applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, and (b) it not be a disguised restriction on international trade."
93. Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons From the Past, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 513 (1998).
94. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAy ROUND vol. 28, 33 I.L.M. 1168
(1994) [hereinafter GATS].
95. See, e.g., United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, Panel Re-
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measures-that panels have begun to take into account the policy purposes (as well as effects) of such measures. 9 6 Consideration of regulatory objects and effects can arise under different
parts of a panel's national treatment analysis, for example, in the
(1) "like products or services" analysis or (2) "no less favorable
treatment" analysis. For example, the purpose behind a regulation that accords different treatment to two products alleged to
be "like products" could influence a panel's determination of
that issue. As a consequence, a distinction based on legitimate
policy could favor a determination that the products distinguished are not like products, and that, therefore, there is no
violation. In taking into account objects and effects in applying
the texts of the agreements themselves, panels necessarily shape
the development of international trading rules.
To illustrate how this jurisprudence has developed, we offer
three examples. In United States-MeasuresAffecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages,9 7 the Government of Canada challenged numerous U.S. state laws that it claimed had a disproportionate impact
on its exports to the United States. With respect to two particular state statutes, Canada presented strong evidence that each
provision had a disproportionate (and negative) impact on its
exports. The first related to a Mississippi provision that applied
a lower rate of taxation on wine made from a certain variety of
grape.9" The panel rejected the U.S. argument that the Mississippi grapes were not "like" other grapes and found that the regulation violated the United States' national treatment obligations under Article III of GATT. The panel noted that the preferential treatment of wine made from grapes grown in a very
limited area of North America was a "rather exceptional basis for
a tax distinction" and afforded "protection to local production
port, DS23/R (Jun. 19, 1992); Canada-Import,Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic
Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Panel Report, 39S/27 (Feb. 18, 1992); JapanCustoms Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages,
Panel Report, 34S/83 (Nov. 10, 1987). By contrast, cases involving measures that discriminate on their face are relatively simple, and GATT case law on these types of cases
is well-settled. See Italian DiscriminationAgainst Imported Agricultural Machinery, Report,
7/S60 (Oct. 23, 1958), Canada-Administrationof the Foreign Investment Review Act, Panel
Report, 30S/140 (July 25, 1983).
96. United States-MeasuresAffecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, Panel Report, 39S/
206 (June 19, 1992).
97. Id.
98. Id. at paras. 5.23-26.
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of wine."9 9 In a revealing comment, the panel added that "the
United States did not claim any public policy purpose for this
Mississippi tax provision other than to subsidize small local producers."l1(
By contrast, the panel affirmed the second provision, a Colorado state law that restricted the distribution of beer with an
alcohol content greater than 3.2% by weight.1 °1 The panel did
not take issue with Canada's contention that Colorado's discrimination against beer with a higher alcoholic content disproportionately disadvantaged its exports relative to competing U.S.
products. However, the panel declined to find against the Colorado law, holding that, for these purposes, beer with high alcohol content was not "like" beer with low alcohol content. The
gist of the panel's reasoning was that the distinction was based
on valid public policy grounds:
In the view of the Panel, therefore, it is imperative that the
like product determination in the context of Article III be
made in such a way that it not unnecessarily infringe upon
the regulatory authority and domestic policy options of contracting parties ....
On the basis of the evidence submitted,
the Panel noted that the relevant laws were passed against the
background of the Temperance movement in the United
States.... [Moreover,] both the statements of the parties and
the legislative history suggest that the alcohol content of beer
has not been singled out as a means
of favouring domestic
10 2
producers over foreign producers.
This form of analysis reached its fullest exposition in 1994,
in United States-Taxes on Automobiles. 1°3 Since then, however,
the WTO Appellate Body has issued decisions that have been
construed as limitations on the extent to which the public policy
purpose and effects of a statute may be taken into account in
evaluating its WTO-consistency (e.g., in analyzing whether the
foreign and domestic goods being compared are "like products").-' 4 The parameters of this Essay do not permit a detailed
99. Id. at para. 5.26.

100. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.

21, 27-28.

Id. at para 5.70.
Id. at para 5.74.
United States-Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R (Oct. 11, 1994).
See Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2 (Sept. 25, 1996) at 16, 18,
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parsing of the relevant Appellate Body decisions in this regard.10 5 However, our view is that those decisions do not shut
the door on an appropriate evaluation of the public policy purpose of facially-neutral legislation in the consideration of its
WTO-consistency. We are not alone in holding this view. Professor Robert Hudec agrees that the more flexible approach to this
vital area of dispute settlement is likely to live on, albeit not as an
express element of panels' analyses. °6 Indeed, if Professor
Hudec and we were proved to be wrong, and Appellate Body
decisions were seen to preclude an evaluation in some way of the
public policy purposes of facially-neutral legislation, WTO panels
would be deprived of the authority to exercise reasoned judgment.
The development of national treatment jurisprudence in
facially neutral cases has been the subject of extensive scholarly
discourse and debate.10 7 Our purpose here is not to contribute
an additional in-depth analysis of the relevant case law and principles. Rather, it is to highlight that this area provides an additional channel for panels to apply the first dimension of the
shaping function: namely, deferring to national regulations in
appropriate circumstances. Panels can do so by taking into account, in the words of Professor Hudec, whether a measure has
"a bona fide regulatory purpose and whether [its] effect on conditions of competition is protective."' 1 0'
If panels exercise sound judgment in this fashion-based
on sound jurisprudence, using the text and interpretative history
of the relevant WTO agreement-they can advance the shaping
process in a way that may begin to adjust the balance between
policing and shaping. As Hudec concludes: "So long as the tribunal gets it right most of the time-that is, decides its cases
105. See, e.g., Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS75/12 (Apr. 8, 1999); Canada-CertainMeasures ConcerningPeriodicals,Report of
the Appellate Body, AB-1997-2 (June 30, 1997); Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Panel
Report, WT/DS87/R, WT/DS1lO/R (June 15, 1999).
106. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on NationalRegulation: Requiem
for an Aim and Effects Test, 32 INT'L L., 619, 634 (1998); see also id. at 635 (Appellate
Body's apparent rejection of aim and effects approach "does not mean, however, that
the "aim and effects" approach has been exterminated. It simply means that it will
remain under ground.").
107. See id.; Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatoiy State:
A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1401 (1994).
108. See Hudec, supra note 106, at 627.
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according to the larger community's perception of right and
wrong behavior-the decisions tend to be accepted, and in an
opaque sort of way they even succeed in guiding conduct toward
the proper goals."' 9
C. Mechanisms Outside the WTO
A third way to affect the balance between policing and shaping is for countries to use a variety of forums outside the WTO,
including regional arrangements, bilateral agreements, and preferential trade arrangements." l0 Over the past two years, the
United States has used several new initiatives outside the WTO
to bring the issue of labor standards into the trade agenda. For
example, in January 1999, the United States entered into an
agreement with Cambodia establishing a quota on textile and
apparel products that the United States would import from Cambodia. The agreement contained a novel escalator clause,
whereby the quota would be increased if, in December 1999, the
United States determined that Cambodia was in "substantial
compliance" with Cambodia's own laws embodying international
core labor standards.
As it turned out, Cambodia did make significant progress by
November, but not enough to support a finding of "substantial
11
Under a strict reading of the agreement, it was
compliance.""
an all-or-nothing deal. But, the United States recognized that
Cambodia's progress should not go unrewarded. Therefore, in
May 2000, in exchange for certain commitments on further progress, the United States granted Cambodia a partial expansion of
its quota. 1 2 The May commitments included continuous monitoring by the International Labor Organization ("ILO"). Subsequently, the United States identified additional labor-related
109. Id. at 634.
110. WTO rules permit certain special relationships to develop among subsets of
members. For example, Article XXIV of GATT permits parties to enter into free trade
agreements, provided that (with certain limited exceptions) duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories. A similar provision with
respect to services is contained in Article V of the GATS. Also, developed country members have obtained waivers to provide special preferences to developing countries. See
Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries.
111. 64 Fed. Reg. 70217 (Dec. 16, 1999).
112. 65 Fed. Reg. 30571 (May 12, 2000).
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benchmarks and, in September 2000, granted an additional
quota increase,3 in recognition of progress toward meeting those
benchmarks. 1
The Cambodia case is remarkable in several respects. First,
while WTO members were quarreling over the premise that
there is an inherent link between trade and labor issues, the two
parties to this agreement effectively acknowledged that there is
such a link. Second, they did so in a way that was trade-enhancing, rather than trade-restricting. The motivation for Cambodia
to improve worker rights protection was an expansion of quota
in case of success, not a reduction of quota in case of failure.
Thus, the agreement serves as a retort to those who claim that
the goal of those who point out connections between trade and
labor standards is rank "protectionism." Third, while countries
were arguing over how the WTO and the ILO might be brought
together to work on trade-and-labor matters, the United States
and Cambodia developed at least one working model for bringing the ILO into this area. The two countries harnessed the labor expertise and resources of that organization to help monitor
Cambodia's implementation of its obligations under its agreement with the United States.
A second example is the recently signed free trade agreement between the United States andJordan." 4 As in the case of
the Cambodia agreement, this bilateral setting presented an opportunity to address the nexus between trade and labor standards (as well as the linkage between trade and environmental
regulation) that had proved intractable at the November 1999
WTO Ministerial. In the agreement's preamble, the parties express their mutual desire to promote higher labor standards and
effective enforcement of labor law. In the body of the agreement, each party undertakes that it will "not fail to effectively
enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Par1 15
ties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement."
And, by operation of the agreement's dispute settlement provi113. See 65 Fed. Reg. 56537 (Sept. 19, 2000); see also Cambodia Unlikely to Get Full
Hike of Labor-Linked Textile Quotas, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 15, 2000, at 3.
114. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area art. 6.4(a).
115. Id.
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sions (Article 17), that commitment will be enforceable through
the same mechanism as other parts of the agreement.
A third illustration is the operation of preferential trade
programs. Under its Generalized System of Preferences" 6
("GSP"), the United States provides duty-free treatment to certain imports from qualifying developing countries. In the case
of certain groups of countries (sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean Basin and Central America, and the Andean countries),
the United States provides additional trade preferences (i.e.,
duty-free treatment for categories of goods not covered by GSP
and relaxation of quantitative restrictions that ordinarily would
apply to certain goods)."7
Each of the preferential trade programs contains a list of
criteria that must be evaluated before the President designates a
country for beneficiary status. These include factors such as
level of development, extent of protection of intellectual property rights, extent of market access for U.S. goods and services,
and (since 1984) steps to accord core internationally recognized
worker rights. The same criteria apply in determining whether a
country's benefits should be limited, suspended, or withdrawn.
In 2000, the United States expanded benefits under the
Caribbean Basin trade preference program." 8 In doing so, Congress strengthened the eligibility criteria relating to worker
rights in several key respects." 9 In fact, in making its initial designation of countries eligible for the expanded benefits, the Administration took this higher standard seriously and even
2
granted certain countries eligibility on a probationary basis.' 1
116. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2461-66 (2000)
117. See 19 U.S.C. § 27-01(1994) (providing duty-free treatment to certain goods
from Caribbean and Central American countries); 19 U.S.C. § 3207(1994) (providing
duty-free treatment to certain goods from Andean countries).
118. United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, Pub. L. No. 106-200,
§ 211, 114 Stat. 251 (2000)
119. For example, the new law required a higher standard to evaluate whether
core rights were being adequately protected and included an additional element relating to the worst forms of child labor, which countries committed to eradicate in ILO
Convention 182. See Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, U.N. ESCOR, 56th
Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/51, para. 4 (2000) [hereinafter Convention No. 182].
120. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Announces
AGOA/CBI Country Designations, Release No. 00-67 (Oct. 2, 2000) ("Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua will be subject to further review or monitoring with
respect to worker rights issues.").
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As in the Cambodia and Jordan agreements, the United
States used the expansion of trade preferences to the Caribbean
Basin countries as an opportunity to shape trade as it expanded
trade. Each of these cases illustrates the possibility of accomplishing outside the WTO objectives that may not be achievable on a
worldwide basis in the short term. These mechanisms are important both in and of themselves and in their capacity to cultivate
broader support for shaping trade as well as policing and expanding trade.
In fact, there is specific precedent for initiatives begun on a
unilateral or bilateral basis percolating up to the multilateral
level. This, in essence, is the story of TRIPs, as noted above.
TRIPs offers a model for articulating and enforcing rules in
small settings and then broadening on that experience in increasingly larger settings. We expect that this model will be followed in other areas, particularly in view of the structural limitations on shaping trade through the WTO. The recent efforts on
trade and labor seem to bear this out. If the United States continues to make that issue a priority in future bilateral and regional trade arrangements, it may eventually become a part of
the multilateral agenda in the way that intellectual property did.
CONCLUSION
A. Summary of Argument
In this Essay, we have tried to explore the key dimensions of
what appears to be a growing dilemma for the world trading system. The economy has taken on global dimensions, but regulation of the economy is still largely the province of sovereign
states. To the extent that states have agreed to put in place an
enforceable rules-based regime through creation of the WTO,
the rules are seen as encouraging rather than shaping economic
globalization. In short, there is a growing sense of imbalance
between the policing function and the shaping function of rulesbased world trade.
To underscore the significance of this imbalance we reviewed the history of the analogous situation in the United States
in the early twentieth century. While the context was different
in several respects, the concept was the same. The country was
trying to grapple with the realization that the national economy
had become truly national, but regulation of the economy was
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still largely a state-based matter. To the extent that the federal
government was involved in regulation of the economy, it was
through the Supreme Court's invocation of the dormant Commerce Clause as a mechanism for keeping the channels of commerce unfettered. The sense of imbalance between policing of
commerce and shaping of commerce drove the Progressive
Movement and eventually led to a sea change in the role of the
federal legislature in shaping commerce.
The lesson we take from the historical analogy is that an
imbalance between policing and shaping of commerce within an
integrated economic system puts pressure on the system. The
more stark the imbalance and the longer it lasts, the greater the
pressure will be. Eventually, the pressure can bring the system to
a point of crisis. For the system to endure, there must be outlets
for this pressure that can bring about an adjustment in the balance between policing and shaping.
In the United States, the principal outlet was an expansion
of active regulation of interstate commerce by the federal legislature. An updated interpretation of the constitutional power to
"regulate commerce" was supplied by the Supreme Court, which
affirmed Congress's role under the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce, including by passing laws affecting everything from workplace safety, to protection of the environment,
to civil rights.
The world trading system does not have a legislature endowed with the power to regulate commerce. But there is at
least the potential that a variety of mechanisms can be used to
adjust the balance between policing and shaping. In particular,
we see potentially important roles for the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and for the web of trade arrangements that
WTO members are building outside the WTO. WTO dispute
settlement can mediate the inherent tension between free-flowing commerce and national autonomy. How it does that may
alleviate concerns by some that rules-based trade is only about
making the world safe for multinational corporations. Meanwhile, trade arrangements outside the WTO can be used to articulate and implement norms that are not easily introduced in a
worldwide setting in the first instance.
It is vital that the United States and other players in the
world trading system understand the role that these tools can
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play in adjusting the balance between policing and shaping. If
they do, they may well be able to avoid an eventual crisis of legitimacy in the world trading system.
B. Final Thoughts
In closing, we would like to address two concerns that some
may have with the thoughts and proposals discussed in this Essay.
First, there is clearly a concern among some that addressing
regulatory issues such as labor and environmental standards
could lead to an unraveling of the progress the GATT and the
WTO have achieved to expand international trade and promote
economic growth around the world. Put another way, the question is whether rectifying the imbalance between the policing
and shaping functions of international trading rules will lead to
a significant weakening of the policing function. Those who
hold these concerns often assert that addressing non-commercial issues in some manner in a "trade" context will put us on a
slippery slope of trade de-liberalization. They point out that
some who seek to address labor standards, environmental regulation, and other similar matters may be using these issues as
stalking horses for blocking trade liberalization or even rolling
back the clock.
These are valid questions and merit serious answers. On the
subject of whether rectifying the current imbalance would risk
putting the world trading system on a slippery slope, we offer two
points. First, the example of the Progressive Era in the United
States should provide a substantial measure of comfort. There,
the result of strengthening the ability to shape the rules of commerce was not the atomization or dismantling of the national
economy that had been cemented through the Supreme Court's
application of the dormant Commerce Clause or the rollback of
industrialization. To the contrary, finding appropriate ways to
regulate trusts, provide health and safety and other standards for
workers and consumers, strengthening environmental regulation, and enforcing civil rights have served only to strengthen
the U.S. economy-to say nothing of the benefits these steps
have generated for American society.
A second point in response to the slippery slope concern is
that, to the extent there is a slippery slope, the GATT system has
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been on that slope from the start. The fundamental national
treatment principle of the GATT (Article III), and the enumerated exceptions that may be invoked to justify deviation from
GATT Principles (Article XX), among other provisions, by their
express language and interpretative histories, enable a consideration of public policy purposes in the determination of whether
a measure violates the GATT. The issue is not whether these considerations should enter into the equation, but how.
With respect to the question of the motives of some of those
who seek inclusion of labor and environmental issues on the
trade agenda, our response is that it is always possible to question the motives of some who hold a particular position. That is
not the key point. The key question is whether answers can be
found to tensions in the trading system that even its most ardent
advocates recognize.
Second, some may ask: why focus on U.S. history exclusively
in addressing issues that confront an international trading system of which the United States is only one member? Isn't the
history of other countries also relevant? Our answer is: of
course. In fact, we hope that this Essay will prompt others to
offer additional constructive proposals-including ones based
on the history of other countries-for how best to advance
global trading rules at this critical time. Just as the disparities in
levels of economic development, culture and other variables are
challenges for the world trading system, so the diversity of tradition and sources of knowledge and wisdom are a key strength.
As the philosopher George Santayana wrote: "Those who
forget the past are doomed to repeat it." We have no choice but
to remember and then to use any historical analogy (including
the one offered here) with analytical rigor and care.
In regard to the Progressive Era in the United States, there
are important benefits that can be gained by examining its lessons. First, policy makers in the United States must continue to
address our own issues with respect to U.S. goals for the world
trading system. To that extent, our own history, of course,
speaks with particular force. For other countries and the world,
we hope that the example of the Progressive Era will illustrate
that the kinds of tensions currently confronting the world trading system have arisen in other contexts and have been addressed successfully.
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Some have suggested that the United States is now at a stage
of development at which it can afford to have and act upon concerns related to labor standards-and that the United States
should allow other countries to go through the same maturing
process as it did over the last century. The response to that concern is that the process of accelerating the shaping of trade rules
should not-and need not-deny to any developing country a
comparative advantage. With that in mind, if one group of
countries has learned from an historical experience in a way that
can benefit other countries without their having to reinvent the
wheel, it seems to us that there is no reason not to learn from
and apply that experience. As President Clinton stated in remarks at the 2000.World Economic Forum, addressing the same
historical parallels we have discussed in this Essay: "The answer
is to look [at] what happened in the transition from the agricultural economy to the industrial economy, develop a twenty-first
faster-not
century version of that, and get it done much, much
1 21
to run to the past, but not to deny the present."
In short, the imperative for all those who care about the
world trading system and seek to improve it is to have an honest
dialogue about its shortcomings and advance creative and constructive proposals to overcome them. To achieve the dialogue
and make meaningful changes, we must all be willing and able to
put aside preconceptions, pride and fears and get on with the
task of making improvements.
At the end of Patton, the general is pictured alone with his
bull terrier, walking off into a field near allied headquarters. It
is after the German surrender and General Eisenhower has just
relieved Patton of his command of the U.S. Third Army. Again
turning to history, Patton recalls a tradition of Roman conquerors:
For more than a thousand years, Roman conquerors returning from the wars enjoyed the honor of a triumph: a tumultuous parade. In the procession came trumpeters and
musicians and strange animals from the conquered territories, together with carts laden with treasure and captured
armaments. The conqueror rode in a triumphal chariot....

121. President William Clinton, Remarks at World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland (Jan. 29, 2000)..
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A slave stood behind the conqueror holding a golden crown,
whispering in his ear a warning-that all glory is fleeting.

The GATT/WTO system has achieved much in its first halfcentury. Much more remains to be done. This is no time to
dwell defensively on the system's accomplishments as an excuse
to not moving ahead aggressively to address its shortcomings.
Rather, we should articulate the important benefits that trade
liberalization has brought, then roll up our sleeves and undertake the improvements necessary to make the system even
stronger for the next fifty years.

